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Abstract: Response inhibition, whether reactive or proactive, is mostly investigated in a narrow
cognitive framework. We argue that it be viewed within a broader frame than the action being
inhibited, i.e., in the context of emotion and motivation of the individual at large. This is particularly
important in the clinical domain, where the motivational strength of an action can be driven by
threat avoidance or reward seeking. The cognitive response inhibition literature has focused on
stopping reactively with responses in anticipation of clearly delineated external signals, or proactively
in limited contexts, largely independent of clinical phenomena. Moreover, the focus has often
been on stopping efficiency and its correlates rather than on inhibition failures. Currently, the
cognitive and clinical perspectives are incommensurable. A broader context may explain the apparent
paradox where individuals with disorders characterised by maladaptive action control have difficulty
inhibiting their actions only in specific circumstances. Using Obsessive Compulsive Disorder as a case
study, clinical theorising has focused largely on compulsions as failures of inhibition in relation to
specific internal or external triggers. We propose that the concept of action tendencies may constitute
a useful common denominator bridging research into motor, emotional, motivational, and contextual
aspects of action control failure. The success of action control may depend on the interaction between
the strength of action tendencies, the ability to withhold urges, and contextual factors.
Keywords: stop signal; response inhibition; proactive control; reactive control; Obsessive
Compulsive Disorder
1. Introduction
Effective stopping of maladaptive or inappropriate actions is closely linked to be-
havioural control and has long been of great interest to clinicians, cognitive psychologists,
and neuroscientists. Inhibition of responses is assumed to contribute to adaptive, goal-
directed behaviour. As such, it appears to be a useful construct with considerable face
validity, often consisting of a clearly observable and intentional suppression of a planned,
already initiated, or on-going action. Stopping of actions also appears in the conceptualisa-
tion of control processes such as executive functioning [1], and in this capacity could be
representative of other self-regulation and control functions. It is also useful in clinically
related theorising of numerous mental health disorders [2]. In fact, much of the litera-
ture focusing on cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology makes reference to
difficulties in response inhibition in various disorders as motivating the need for better
understanding of the cognitive mechanisms, individual differences, neural systems, and
neurochemistry involved. It is these difficulties in response inhibition that are apparent
in mental health conditions such as Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD). OCD has
received considerable empirical and theoretical consideration in the response inhibition
literature, making it a useful case study, and will largely be the focus of the present paper.
Following a brief introduction to the broader construct of inhibitory control from a clinical
perspective, we examine how response inhibition is explored empirically in controlled
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lab settings and the challenges and opportunities encountered in clinical research. We
then consider response inhibition difficulties in the broader everyday context, where it is
believed to underly maladaptive symptoms, and introduce a framework incorporating
action tendencies and response inhibition with a goal of advancing the utility of response
inhibition in clinical research.
The importance of volitional behavioural and cognitive inhibitory control to clinical
practice is apparent from inspection of the clinical criteria of mental health conditions. The
DSM-5, one of the gold-standard diagnostic systems, outlines a list of criteria for each
diagnosis, where patients typically must fulfil a minimum set out of a list of possible criteria
over a given time period [3]. There are numerous DSM-5 criteria across a multitude of dis-
orders that refer to instances of maladaptive behaviours where individuals appear to have
difficulties in stopping, such as when struggling to overcome habits, to cease disruptive
or maladaptive actions, or to resist temptations. For example, in OCD, where individuals
experience unwanted obsessions and “attempt to ignore or suppress such thoughts, urges,
or images”, typically unsuccessfully. Moreover, individuals with OCD are characterised by
compulsions which are repetitive behaviours or mental acts an individual feels driven to
perform and are clearly excessive, time-consuming, and often cause impairment in social,
occupational, or other important areas of functioning. In Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity
Disorder (ADHD), which is characterised by markedly different symptoms, diagnostic
criteria include interrupting or intruding on others, blurting out answers, and ‘leaving
their seat in situations when remaining seated is expected’. In the case of substance use
disorders, stopping difficulties, again, appear key with individuals continuing to use, even
when it causes problems, and wanting to cut down or stop using the substance but not
managing to [3].
Taken together, from a clinical perspective, it is clear that whilst difficulties inhibit-
ing responses are relevant to various disorders, the manifestations and instantiations in
everyday life are varied and multifaceted. Moreover, whilst almost all individuals can
exercise control and effective inhibition in some circumstances, it is the chronic, distressing,
and impairing nature in everyday life attributable in part to behavioural disinhibition
that characterise those who meet diagnostic criteria. Theorising of several disorders has
consequently posited a central role for failures of cognitive control, and more specifically
behavioural inhibition. In the case of OCD, inhibition difficulties have been proposed to
underly many of the symptoms and neurocognitive findings [4]. Similarly, disruptions to
inhibitory control in stimulant drug use are believed to contribute to various aspects of the
disorder, including as a pre-existing vulnerability in at-risk individuals, through escalation
to dependence, to promotion of relapse in chronic users [5]. The impaired response inhibi-
tion and salience attribution (iRISA) model specifically proposes that a decreased ability
to inhibit maladaptive behaviours together with deficient salience attribution underlies
addiction [6].
The presence and centrality of poor inhibitory control across distinct mental health
conditions has contributed to its conceptualisation as a transdiagnostic construct [2]. That
is, a core cognitive mechanism whose impairment contributes to the development or
maintenance of multiple disorders. Indeed, response inhibition/suppression specifically
appears under cognitive control in the Research Domain Criteria “matrix”, a framework
advanced for integrating multiple levels of information and approaches to research mental
disorders [7]. Not only that, but response inhibition specifically has been proposed as
contributing to higher-order transdiagnostic constructs such as compulsivity and impulsiv-
ity, where in both self-restraint difficulties result in undesirable and maladaptive conse-
quences [8]. Impulsivity encompasses actions and decisions that appear poorly conceived,
prematurely expressed, and unduly risky [9]. Having received considerable theoretical at-
tention, impulsivity has been fractionated into ‘motor impulsivity’ encompassing impaired
response inhibition and ‘decisional impulsivity’, such as reduced delayed discounting of
rewards [10]. Compulsivity on the other hand has been defined as repetitive acts, usually
performed in the form of rigid rituals, accompanied by feelings of having to perform them
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while being aware that these acts are not in line with one’s overall goal [11,12]. Much of
the overlap between these two independent and multifaceted constructs can be attributed
to poor response inhibition and control, which likely contributes in distinct ways to the
clinical presentation of each. For example, the persistence of inappropriate behaviours
that result in negative consequences can be classed as impulsive when considering action
initiation in the context of controlling desired or undesired urges but can also be classed as
compulsive when relating to difficulties in stopping already initiated action or response
sequences, leading to their repetitive nature. Further, response inhibition difficulties in
and of themselves cannot be attributed to impulsivity or compulsivity necessarily, being
associated with either.
It is important to bear in mind that from a clinical perspective, difficulties in response
inhibition are never considered to be the only cognitive impairment in a given disorder but
operate as part of a range of general control-related issues (e.g., [13]). Inhibition typically
encompasses not only response (or motor) inhibition but also cognitive inhibitory control,
as measured by selective attention or conflict tasks such as Stroop, flanker, and Simon
tasks. This is also consistent with research on executive functioning attributing inhibition
to be part of a set of multiple yet separable general-purpose control mechanisms. One
influential model posits inhibition within the context of cognitive flexibility or shifting and
updating [1], though there is some uncertainty as to the exact and unique role of inhibition
in this conceptualisation [14]. Indeed, in meta-analyses of cognitive functioning of OCD,
case-control comparisons have comparable deficits of response inhibition to other executive
function domains [15,16]. This finding is hardly unique to disorders of compulsivity and
can also be seen in disorders of impulsivity such as ADHD [17,18].
2. Conceptualisation of Response Inhibition
2.1. Measuring Response Inhibition
Central to advances in the conceptualisation of response inhibition as described thus
far has been the adoption of paradigms such as the stop signal task (SST) and go/no-go
(GNG) task. Outside of clinical practice which relies on interview, observational, and
self-report practices, these have allowed for individual-specific empirical measures of
inhibiting prepotent responses in controlled settings. GNG tasks present go and no-go
stimuli, requiring participants to respond to the former and withhold responding to the
presentation of the latter, at times being viewed as response suppression. In contrast, stop
signal tasks (SST) require participants to make a quick response to go stimuli presented on
all trials but to countermand or inhibit these prepotent responses when stop signals are
occasionally presented immediately after a go stimulus, thus being viewed as response
cancellation [19]. The delay between the go and stop stimuli largely dictates whether a
participant is likely to succeed in cancelling their planned response. The use of a fixed set of
delays which is independent of participant performance involves a considerable number of
trials [19]. In clinical research, the delay is often titrated for a given participant depending
on performance using a staircase procedure, lengthening the delay duration following suc-
cessful stopping and shortening it following failed stopping [20]. This enables performance
to be assessed in a relatively brief period of time, thereby minimising testing duration and
demands on participants. Nevertheless, the staircase procedure also introduces additional
strategic demands as task parameters shift depending on participant performance.
These inhibition tasks allow the measurement of response execution in the form of
latencies to the go stimuli and their accuracy, but crucially also provide assessment of
stopping performance, and as such are versatile in offering measures of multiple related
outcome measures. In GNG, this is often in the form of commission errors. SST can
also provide the proportion of stop trials where a participant failed to inhibit, but this is
qualified by the specific delay values and the staircase procedure, which aims at achieving
a success rate of approximately 50% to allow for estimation of stopping latencies. In any
case, using the full distribution of go latencies alongside the rates of failed and successful
stopping allows for the estimation of the time required to inhibit a response [19]. Although
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it cannot be observed directly, this stop latency is estimated by a race model, which in
turn relies on several assumptions. The so-called stop signal reaction time (SSRT) is a key
outcome measure of how quickly stopping is enacted and is often taken as a gauge of the
efficiency of stopping and taken as the key stopping outcome measure [21].
Though the use of response inhibition tasks, and SST in particular, is flourishing
in clinical research [21], there are discrepancies between the empirical measurement of
response inhibition and its clinical conceptualisation. One key aspect is that both SSRT and
commission errors measure stopping that is triggered in response to a clearly observable
external stimulus (i.e., the stop or no-go stimuli, respectively). This responding to an
external signal to stop can be considered a case of reactive inhibition. Reactive paradigms
have been argued to be limited models of control as relevant to mental health disorders [22].
Endogenous signals or intent rather than external signals are an alternative prominent drive
to stop or restrain one’s actions in everyday life that are of greater clinical relevance. Known
as proactive stopping, this typically involves anticipating and preparing for the restraint
of actions and adjusting behaviour accordingly [23]. Whilst clinical research into mental
health disorders has predominantly focused on empirical assessment of reactive stopping,
clinical presentation points to the importance of both reactive and proactive stopping as
well as possible interactions between them (see below). Though far behind its reactive
counterpart, proactive inhibition can be assessed in a complementary fashion. For example,
in SST, it has long been known that compared to a block of go trials often presented as
part of initial practice, the introduction of stop signals in a subsequent block leads to
a general response slowing on go trials [24]. This has been attributed to participants
anticipating the imminent need to stop and adjusting their overall response strategy
proactively. Proactive stopping can also be investigated by changing the frequency of
stop trials or manipulating the predictability that a stop will occur with the introduction
of go- or stop-related cues [25–29]. Proactive stopping has also been considered in other
paradigms, such as when stopping continuous actions or arm reaching, allowing for
additional insight [27,30]. The explicit consideration of proactive inhibition in stopping
tasks is the culmination of the recognition that multiple inhibitory control processes may
be taking place in such tasks [23]. A challenge to clinical research is the adequate capture
and identification of proactive versus reactive stopping given the potentially confounding
roles of strategic demands across groups.
2.2. Response Inhibition Tasks in Clinical Research
There is considerable value in investigating stopping behaviourally from a clinical
perspective. The stop-signal in particular holds appeal in this sense as it appears straight-
forward to administer to healthy individuals and patients alike in a relatively brief period
of time. Moreover, task instantiation and administration may appear relatively uniform
across studies, presumably yielding a comparable general marker of inhibition (i.e., SSRT).
At the same time, the task can also be easily adapted to different purposes. However, it is
important to consider the goal of any particular study. For example, studies commonly use
cross-sectional design to establish whether a particular group, such as those with OCD,
exhibit worse stopping performance as measured by SSRT compared to a control group,
attributing this to differences in the effectiveness of suppressing responses. To date, such
studies have focused largely on reactive stopping, noting medium effects, though against
a background of considerable heterogeneity within groups and between studies [15,16].
These medium effect sizes indicate overlap between patients and controls, meaning there
is a considerable subgroup of patients who have no discernible impairment. Employment
of response inhibition tasks in clinical settings is not limited to cross-sectional studies.
Stopping has been suggested as an endophenotype or biomarker offering insight into the
underlying mechanisms of the disorder and with the possibility of being a potential predic-
tor of therapy effectiveness [4,31]. Given its potential role in aetiology and maintenance,
stopping is even being assessed as a target for intervention itself [32], though its suitability
for uses aimed at capturing individual differences has been questioned [33,34].
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As with all clinical research, any stopping impairments relating to a particular condi-
tion or their absence and the heterogeneity within patient groups must be interpreted in
light of medication status and comorbidities [35–37]. Comorbidities in many mental health
disorders such as OCD are the rule rather than the exception, though the most common con-
ditions of anxiety and depression are not believed to be directly associated with response
inhibition deficits [38,39]. Medication status may similarly contribute to heterogeneity in
findings, with some evidence for differences in brain structure between medicated and
medication-naïve OCD patients in areas associated with response inhibition [40]. Moreover,
medication status may be confounded with pre-medication disorder severity, with those
exhibiting more severe symptoms being more likely to be prescribed mediation, including
dopaminergic drugs which are known to affect motor control and serotonergic drugs
which affect some forms of motor restraint, though not SSRT [41]. Additional variation
between studies may result from differences in task design and administration, which can
have a considerable impact on performance and on the reliability and robustness of the
outcome measures [21]. Heterogeneity in findings pertaining to SST in particular may
result from the central role of task instructions and feedback [24], which govern the extent
to which participants are likely to employ proactive inhibition. Experimenter bias may
further play a role at times given the challenge for experimenters to be blinded to group
status. Encouragingly, there is now clear consensus in the field as to SST administration
and reporting practices [21].
A further challenge is that interpretation of findings from a clinical perspective is still
far from straightforward. Even if there are robust response inhibition deficits in the majority
or a proportion of patients, what may this mean? The presence of difficulties in stopping
in cross-sectional correlational designs does not indicate a causal role in the development
or maintenance of a disorder such as OCD [42]. For example, it has been proposed that
inhibitory alongside other cognitive deficits in OCD result from acute and long-term effects
of stress, as well as additional demands on attentional and control functions diverted to
cope with or suppress obsessions and compulsions [15,43]. While assessing performance
in first-degree biological relatives may speak to this, having indicated they too have some
inhibitory deficits or abnormalities [31], it remains unclear exactly how such an underlying
vulnerability directly contributes to symptom expression over time. Moreover, the rele-
vance of stopping in particular for so many different and varied psychiatric conditions
and seeming lack of specificity complicates its conceptual role. The neglect of proactive
inhibition in cognitive theorising further contributes to the lack of conceptual clarity. No
doubt the literature is set to explore proactive inhibition alongside reactive inhibition and
the possible interactions between them, but many of the issues outlined above will still be
relevant. Ultimately, greater clarity as to the purpose of investigating response inhibition
in clinical contexts is also needed, be it to elucidate symptom-related mechanisms or in aid
of diagnostic or intervention-related purposes.
2.3. On Caring about a Response: Internal and External Context
There is another underlying factor playing a role in the seeming discrepancies between
the empirical response inhibition research and its clinical conceptualisation. On the one
hand, clinical observations of OCD involve dramatic failures of control, with patients
unable to refrain from performing rituals for up to several hours daily. This is not com-
mensurable with the medium effect sizes reported above. A key issue that speaks to this is
the relatively impoverished contexts in which countermanding and stopping are typically
assessed [44]. This has already been acknowledged by many authors along with the recog-
nition that most inhibitory actions be they reactive or proactive are shaped by memory
and strategy [45]. Building on this, we argue that clinically relevant behaviours to an even
greater degree are embedded in specific contexts and are shaped by affect and motivation
driven by perceived rewards, or in the case of OCD, perceived threats. This is consistent
with the appreciation that emotion and motivational processes influence and are often
integral to cognitive control [46]. This also dovetails with the view that a comprehensive
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characterisation of executive functioning in general must encompass hot and cool cognition,
as they are inextricably integrated within the human psychological experience throughout
development and adulthood [47]. More specifically, individuals struggling with mental
health conditions such as OCD will have difficulties suppressing maladaptive behaviours
in specific circumstances, often in heightened states of arousal resulting from fear, anxiety,
or negative urgency. For example, a patient who fears serious harm to their loved ones may
find themselves unable to refrain from repetitively approaching and checking electrical
sockets and cords but do this only in the home environment. Clinical observation indicates
that a heightened state is not always needed as extensive, repetitive rituals can take place
habitually with low affect and arousal. However, in these cases, individuals will typically
report high distress if prevented or refrained from carrying out their compulsions or even
at the mere thought of this happening.
One approach to address inhibitory control under such particular contexts is to in-
troduce stimuli that are expected to elicit arousal or negative affect, as task-relevant or
irrelevant. Numerous studies in non-patient samples have pointed to the deleterious effects
of task-irrelevant negative emotion and arousal, presumably resulting from increased atten-
tion and processing of the stimuli [48–51]. Findings from task-relevant stimuli have been
more mixed, for example emotive stop signals in the form of happy or fearful faces were
found to lead to faster stopping compared to neutral faces, whilst a stimulus previously
paired with a shock resulted in slower stopping [52]. Overall, research has pointed to
complex interactions between inhibitory control, attention, and arousal, possibly explained
by the inverted U function of arousal such that at times emotion can enhance performance
whilst at others it can be deleterious. A similar experimental approach in OCD research
builds on provocation studies [53] investigating inhibitory performance in response to
symptom-specific stimuli. For example, by looking at inhibition to OC-related words [39].
This study found that compared to controls, patients with OCD were similarly impaired
regardless of word content or the presence of comorbid depression, supporting a general
inhibitory impairment. However, patients were even slower to switch responding away
from the OC words, pointing again to the complex interplay between emotion (or arousal),
attention, and executive control. General inhibitory impairments regardless of stimuli type
are found in other conditions such as with addiction, whilst in others such as some eating
disorders impairments appear in symptom-specific contexts [54,55].
A different approach explores how motivation may affect response inhibition by
introducing incentives (e.g., monetary rewards) to standard stopping paradigms. In non-
patients samples, it is evident that this can lead to complex strategic interactions, with
participants adjusting responding to optimise performance given the modified task con-
straints [56]. Stopping can alternatively be enhanced, impaired, or seemingly unaffected
depending on the aspects of performance that are being incentivised and the trade-offs be-
tween stop and go processes [56–58]. Though the introduction of rewards or punishments
appear to trigger proactive control adjustments, their exact role is often unclear and com-
plex [59]. The effects of motivation on inhibition in the form of rewards or punishments in
OCD have not been extensively tested, in part due to concerns about confounding effects of
arousal, anxiety, and mood. In a GNG study using punishment and reward, non-depressed
patients with OCD did show reduced proactive control selectively under punishment con-
ditions [60]. Monetary incentives are undoubtedly effective in changing the motivational
state of participants and may point to important group differences. Moreover, failures of
control in light of symptom-specific incentives or threats may offer additional insight, as
suggested by evidence from addiction research [61]. This latter study also highlights that
whilst response inhibition research often focuses on stopping efficiency, from a clinical
perspective, it may be advantageous to investigate stopping failures and their triggers.
Theories of emotion typically recognise the interlinked nature of emotion, motivation,
and action [62,63]. Action tendencies constitute a motivational component of emotion,
focused on the preparation and direction of motor-related responses (e.g., approach or
avoidance) [63]. Interestingly, using action tendencies as an important index of fear has been
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suggested as pivotal to advancing research in addressing the paradox between the adaptive
nature of fear conditioning and the dysfunctional nature of pathological anxiety [64].
How proactive and reactive response inhibition may relate to action tendencies in such
frameworks has yet to be explored. In OCD, as will be elaborated on later, action tendencies
may be of particular utility due to the stereotyped, repetitive nature of compulsions.
Taken together, the introduction of affective or motivationally relevant stimuli or
contexts in response inhibition tasks takes steps towards greater clinical relevance, though
often the interpretation of such findings can be more challenging. They also provide one
strategy to bridging the gap between basic cognitive laboratory findings and everyday
behaviour [34]. Careful consideration of the nature of stimulus content within and across
groups can also offer insight into related cognitive processing in non-patient groups as
OCD concerns such as contamination and infection are typically universal [65]. Moreover,
a more holistic view of inhibitory control incorporating clearly defined and conventional
operational measures of proactive control to complement those of reactive control should
advance current understanding. Though no one study or indeed approach can sufficiently
offer a complete picture, lab-based cognitive testing of reactive and proactive response
inhibition can also provide systematic empirical and theoretical rigor. Moreover, they offer
insight into hypothesised psychological mechanisms, capitalising on relatively low task
variance between individuals [33]. This approach can thus help in ascertaining how any
group differences may be related to abnormalities in general cognitive mechanisms or due
to general distress, or alternatively whether they appear only in circumscribed situations
or contexts with patient groups otherwise performing without impairments.
3. Clinical Theorising
3.1. The Cognitive-Behavioural Model of OCD
Taken together, basic cognitive approaches can offer insight into clinically relevant
conditions but appear insufficient in advancing our understanding of the role response
inhibition is playing in conditions such as OCD. Intriguingly, theorising and evidence
from cognitive-behavioural appraisal accounts of OCD have focused on proactive rather
than reactive control. According to such accounts, compulsive behaviours are triggered by
normally occurring intrusive thoughts that are catastrophically interpreted as signifying
harm and responsibility for its prevention [66]. Compulsive behaviours produce momen-
tary relief, however they also provide negative reinforcement to symptoms and maintain
dysfunctional interpretations [66]. For example, a patient with OCD may experience an
intrusion “Did I leave the gas stove on?”. As a result, this patient may check and receive
momentary relief, only to experience the same thought again (“Am I sure I turned off the
gas?”), leading to an increased urge to check, thus getting entangled in a vicious cycle of
doubt and checking. The repetitive thoughts and actions are not construed as failures in
control, but as a paradoxical effect of suppression and compulsive behaviour [67,68].
Several beliefs have been suggested as etiological to the onset and maintenance of
symptoms, or the motivation for proactive control. These include: (1) inflated responsibility,
(2) over-importance of thoughts, (3) excessive concern about the importance of controlling
one’s thoughts, (4) overestimation of threat, (5) intolerance of uncertainty, and (6) per-
fectionism [69]. However, multiple difficulties with this account were found, including
absence of specificity to OCD and lack of these beliefs in a large percentage of individu-
als with OCD [70,71]. Initial evidence also does not seem to support a straightforward
proactive control deficiency in OCD [72–74], though interestingly, one study examined this
in paediatric OCD and did find decreased proactive control performance [75]. Therefore,
there seems to be an impasse between cognitive suggestions of the deficits underlying
symptoms and clinical accounts suggesting dysfunctional beliefs underlying symptoms,
with both accounts thus far lacking.
In order to advance research, it may be useful to examine the seemingly key paradox
that individuals with OCD present with: they desire to control and inhibit unwanted
thoughts or urges but finding themselves being controlled by their recurrent compulsive
Brain Sci. 2021, 11, 979 8 of 13
behaviours and rituals. It may be the case that OCD patients demonstrate difficulties in
the regulation of proactive control. Thus, they exhibit a general tendency of increased
effort for proactive control, which is not relaxed even under circumstances where context
suggests it beneficial to do so. There are various findings supporting this view. For
example, in the Stroop task, OCD patients do not relax control even when neutral trial
percentage is increased [76]. Another example of increased effort for proactive control
in unwarranted circumstances concerns reduced Gratton effect for OCD patients on the
Simon task [77]. A last example concerns an implicit learning task, where individuals
with OCD demonstrated a preference for controlled rather than automatic processing [78].
Paradoxically, despite such seemingly greater efforts for proactive control, OCD patients
and high OC participants were found to present with a reduced sense of agency, feeling as
if “things happen” [79,80]. This decreased sense of agency may be construed as a sense
of failure of reactive control. It is plausible to assume that increased efforts of proactive
control and inevitable failures seen in reactive control [67] can result in a self-perpetuating
vicious cycle. Investigating this cycle may enhance the understanding of OCD by assessing
whether persistent and excessive increases in proactive control are associated with general
or context-specific reduced reactive control. This line of reasoning points to the need to
systematically investigate interactions between proactive and reactive control in conditions
where they may fail. As with any useful account of OCD, contextual and state factors should
help explain the reason that symptoms can occur in specific situations and with particular
stimuli. For example, an individual with OCD may have difficulty resisting a strong urge
to wash in response to experiencing contamination, whereas other important life domains
remain unaffected. Hence, to examine the potential sources of control failure, we must also
investigate the contextual factors that may influence emotional and motivational strength,
or the difficulty to withhold a response in OCD.
3.2. The Utility of Action Tendencies
Relatively little research has been conducted on assessing the strength of response
in OCD, which may be more closely related to the phenomenology of the disorder in
the context of failed inhibition. The construct of action tendencies may be useful in
understanding increased urges to respond in OCD, in what is ultimately a maladaptive
manner. According to Gibson’s affordances theory [81], when we perceive objects, not
only do we perceive their physical properties, but also what we can do with them. Thus,
various stimuli in particular contexts may be differential in their affordances, where stimuli
associated with frequent responses involve strong action tendencies. Action tendencies
may be understood not as a unidirectional consequence of emotion but rather bidirectional,
where emotion-action tendency is part of a whole [82]. Obsessive thoughts in OCD can
be viewed as action tendencies, which can either result from strong emotional states,
or cause them. An example for the reverse directionality between action tendency and
emotion is an experimental study with a student sample, in which participants were
encouraged to increase checking of a daily performed activity, leading to increased threat
perception of these activities (e.g., checking when locking the door, [83]). In OCD, certain
internal or external stimuli are extremely potent in evoking symptoms. Such stimuli (e.g.,
a light switch, a gas knob) may be characterised by strong affordances, that may illicit
increased action tendencies, experienced as urges, and potentially also failures in control.
Compulsions may be the consequence of the activation of strong action tendencies, however
at the same time may constantly perpetuate these action tendencies. Though additional
research on the matter is needed, there is initial evidence for increased action tendencies in
OCD [49,84]. The relation between action tendencies and inhibitory control must further
be understood in light of both proactive and reactive control and their interactions. This
may be particularly pertinent in OCD if there is potentially an overall tendency to prefer
proactive control, which may increase action tendencies even for stimuli that are not subject
to that control. According to this view, constant efforts of proactive control in OCD may
(1) increase the strength of affordances of certain internal or external stimuli possess, and
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(2) increase susceptibility for reactive control failure. This points to the importance of
action tendencies and specific emotions or motivations, together with interactions between
reactive and proactive control as potentially underlying symptoms.
If research supports this line of theorising, it may not only shed light on the underlying
cognitive and psychological processes involved in OCD but also facilitate the develop-
ment of more effective interventions. New interventions are needed because despite the
success of existing first-line treatments, including exposure and response prevention and
serotonergic medications, approximately half of patients do not show adequate response,
with additional patients at a substantial risk of relapse [85]. Changing action tenden-
cies as a clinical intervention has been incorporated in various psychotherapies, such as
dialectical-behaviour therapy [86], and the unified protocol for the treatment of emotional
disorders [62]. Moreover, the addition of fear antagonistic actions has been demonstrated
to increase effectiveness of exposure treatment of acrophobia [87]. These antagonistic
actions were in direct opposition to participants’ threat-relevant fear action tendencies
(e.g., running towards the edge of a railing with eyes closed and hands behind one’s
back). Of relevance, one study has found successfully reduced avoidance behaviour to
contamination-related stimuli by modifying automatic action tendencies in an analogue
sample with high contamination fears with the approach–avoidance task [88]. The addi-
tion of antagonistic actions to threat-relevant fear action tendencies in OCD may enhance
treatment and adaptive control and could be explored by applying the response inhibition
empirical and theoretical framework to actigraphy in the context of symptom provocation.
Ultimately, interventions aimed at decreasing proactive control and increasing effective
proactive inhibition in disorder-relevant contexts may complement other more general
interventions aimed at improving restraint in everyday life [22].
4. Conclusions
In sum, we argue that to date, response inhibition paradigms such as the SST and
GNG have been used to focus on reactive control, while proactive control failures may
instead by more central in many disorders. Moreover, although research has often focused
on group differences under impoverished contexts, clinical consideration suggests the
need to further explore the specific circumstances under which patients experience failures
of control, incorporating affective, motivational, and contextual factors. This alongside
greater theoretical clarity as to what the role of any observed impairments may mean, will
allow a more effective bridging between such lines of research and our understanding of
symptoms as experienced in the everyday by patients. Though we present the arguments
above with a focus on OCD, they are directly applicable to other mental health conditions,
particularly those characterised by excessive impulsivity or compulsivity such as stimulant
drug use. Further, there is also benefit in contrasting and comparing findings between
disorders. We advocate for a close understanding of the issues faced by patients alongside
careful appreciation of the cognitive theory and the strengths and limitations of different
methodological approaches. Ultimately, given the complexity and richness of patient
experiences, viable and useful advances will require a community of researchers and
clinicians working together.
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